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FEDERAL

ANTITRUST

LAW-PRICE

DISCRIMINATION-PROOF

AND MEASUREMENT OF DAMAGES IN TREBLE DAMAGE ACTIONS-

Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act1 makes it unlawful for
a seller to charge buyers who compete with each other different
prices for commodities of like grade and quality. Price discrimination which violates this section operates to confer an unlawful benefit upon a favored buyer by making his costs of obtaining, using, or reselling the particular commodities involved
lower than the similar costs of non-favored buyers and puts nonfavored buyers at a competitive disadvantage to the extent that
the difference in costs affects the ability of favored and non-favored
buyers to compete with one another. If this wrongfully induced
competitive disadvantage results in provable damage to the business of a non-favored buyer, or if the discrimination otherwise
causes provable damage to that buyer, section 4 of the Clayton
Act enables him to recover three times the amount of damage
proved.2
This treble damage provision provides an extraordinary remedy designed to encourage one injured by a violation of an antitrust law to prosecute his claim for damages sustained as a result
of the violation by making it economically feasible for him to
do so. 3 While this extraordinary remedy serves to encourage a
1 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 13(a) (1958). Sections 2(d) and 2(e)
make it unlawful to discriminate among purchasers in providing services or facilities or
in providing payment for services or facilities. 49 Stat. 1527 (1936), as amended,
15 U.S.C. §§ 13(d), (e) (1958). Insofar as such price-related discriminations affect the
respective buyers' operating costs, reducing the costs of favored buyers relative to
the costs of non-favored buyers, they operate to give a favored buyer a competitive
advantage just as a price discrimination does. Insofar as this competitive advantage
may lead to an infliction of damage on a non-favored buyer's business, these price-related
discriminations are no different from ordinary price discriminations. Consequently, though
the elements of violation involved under §§ 2(a), (d) and (e) may be quite different, treble
damage cases arising under these sections can be considered interchangeable for most
purposes in analyzing proof and measurement of damages in actions based on price or
price-related discrimination.
2 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
3 See Wham, Antitrust Treble Damage Suits, 40 A.B.A.J. 1061 (1954); Comment, 46
CALIF. L. REv. 447 n.6 (1958). Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides "That any person
.•• injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor ... .'' 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
However, since the remedy is extraordinary, the language "any person ••• injured" has
been strictly construed, and the availability of the remedy has been limited to persons
who stand in some immediate or direct relationship to the violator. See Karseal Corp. v.
Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 363 (9th Cir. 1955); Timberlake, The Legal Injury
Requirements and Proof of Damages in Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust
Laws, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 231, 240-49 (1961); Comment, 46 CALIF. L. REv. 447 (1958).
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respect for the law on the part of potential law breakers, its primary function in the context of each individual law suit is not
the vindication of the public interest, but the assertion of a private and individual right to compensation for injuries suffered.4
The fact that a recovery is given of three times the amount of
damage proved does not necessarily deprive an individual treble
damage suit of its essentially compensatory nature, for the complexity and prohibitive cost of such a suit require a generous
recovery if the injured party is to be justified in risking the great
expense of a suit and be compensated in any real sense of the
word. Furthermore, the injury inflicted by a typical antitrust
violation is of such a nature that its full extent may seldom (if
ever) be possible to discover, let alone prove. 5
4 "The private-injunction action, like the treble-damage action under § 4 of the Act,
supplements government enforcement of the antitrust laws; but it is the Attorney General
and the United States district attorneys who are primarily charged by Congress with the
duty of protecting the public interest under these laws. The Government seeks its
injunctive remedies on behalf of the general public; the private plaintiff, though his
remedy is made available pursuant to public policy as determined by Congress, may be
expected to exercise it only when his personal interest v.ill be served." United States v.
Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518 (1954).
"The •.• Clayton Act afford[s] a cause of action for those suffering damages. In their
provisions for damages they embody both punitive and compensatory damages but no
recovery can be had unless a case for compensatory damages is made. In the event of
compensatory damages, then automatically the punitive damages follow." Clark Oil Co.
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 14S F.2d 580, 582 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945).
"The conduct of Ascap [defendant] may be a public wrong for which penalties and
other remedies are afforded the government under the statute. But no private right of
action arises unless a plaintiff is injured in his property or business by the violations of
Ascap." Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers,
80 F. Supp. 888, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
Every tort action tends to vindicate the public interest in compensating the injured
and in encouraging lawful and non-tortious conduct. The private antitrust treble damage
action is, of course, a valuable aid in enforcing the antitrust laws, for its treble recovery
feature encourages private ·vigilance and discourages violation. See Flintkote Co. v.
Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 398 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957). See generally
Barber, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: The Robinson-Patman Experience,
30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 181 (1961). The courts have repeatedly recognized this fact, but
they have also recognized that the private action is primarily one to vindicate a private
right to compensation, and that it is only when the private right has been established that
the trebling or "punitive" feature of the action comes into play. Vindication of the public
interest in policing violations is a strictly subordinate aspect of the indi'l-idual private
treble damage suit. See, e.g., Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., supra note 3, at 365;
Maltz v. Sax, 134 F.2d 2, 5 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 772 (1943); Hess v. Anderson,
Clayton & Co., 20 F.R.D. 466, 475 (S.D. Cal. 1957); United States v. Standard Ultramarine
&: Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167, 171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's,
Inc., 117 F. Supp. 747, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Electric Theater Co. v. Twentieth CenturyFox Film Corp., 113 F. Supp. 937, 942 (W.D. Mo. 1953); Winkler-Koch Eng'r Co. v.
Universal Oil Prods. Co., 100 F. Supp. 15, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
5 It has been suggested that the type of business harm inflicted by an antitrust viola-
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In any event, the courts have consistently and uniformly held
that the basic cause of action in a treble damage suit is compensatory in nature,6 and that a plaintiff may not recover treble any
amount until he has established actual damage sustained in the
form of genuine economic loss to his business or property.7 Thus,
courts have refused to award damages where the award would
represent a windfall to the plaintiff,8 and have required that a
plaintiff take steps to mitigate his loss when a reasonable opportunity for doing so exists.9 In the latter instance recovery may be
limited to the cost of mitigation so far as it would or did involve
expense exceeding usual business expenses.
The task of proving damages resulting from price discrimination has been a formidable one, however, and there has been
considerable disagreement as to what constitutes compensable
damage to non-favored buyers, how much a non-favored buyer
must show to establish a claim for such damage, and how much
of that required showing can be provided by proof of the fact
and amount of a particular price (or price-related) discrimination.
Some courts have indicated that "general damages" based on the
tion is "accumulative," that intangible and unmeasurable harm accompanies the tangible
and measurable (e.g., loss of steady customers resulting from a break in their buying
habits), and that the ordinarily recoverable legal damages affords a definite base in
proportion to which liquidated (treble) compensation for the additional intangible damage can be awarded. Vold, Are Threefold Damages Under the Anti-Trust Act Penal or
Compensatory?, 28 KY. L.J. 117, 125, 128-29 (1940).
See cases cited note 4 supra.
See, e.g., Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, supra note 4, at 392; American Can Co. v.
Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38, 54 (8th Cir. 1951); Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v.
Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 1949); Sano Petroleum Corp. v.
American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345, 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); McWirter v. Monroe Calculating
Mach. Co., 76 F. Supp. 456, 465 (W.D. Mo. 1948). The words "business or property" arc
used in the ordinary sense of a commercial venture or enterprise. Peller v. International
Boxing Club, 227 F.2d 593, 595-96 (7th Cir. 1955); Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d
417, 419 (7th Cir. 1942); Broadcasters, Inc. v. Morristown Broadcasting Corp., 185 F. Supp.
641, 644 (D.N.J. 1960); Image &: Sound Serv. Corp. v. Altec Serv. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 237,
239 (D. Mass. 1956).
8 American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., supra note 7, at 54-55; Clark Oil
Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580, 582 (8th Cir. 1945). See also Bruce's Juices,
Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 753 (1947).
9 American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., supra note 7, at 55; Sun Cosmetic
Shoppe v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 1949); Strauss v. Victor
Talking Mach. Co., 297 Fed. 791, 801-03 (2d Cir. 1924); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 826, 829 (M.D. Pa.), afj'd, 281 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 901 (1960); Lowry v. Tile, Mantel &: Grate Ass'n, 106 Fed. 38, 47
(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900), afj'd sub nom. Montague v. Lowry, 115 Fed. 27 (9th Cir. 1902), afj'd,
193 U.S. 38 (1904).
6
7

1962]

COMMENTS

1107

amount of the discrimination may be awarded, on the ground
that in particular cases such an award is a reasonably accurate
reflection of actual pecuniary damage sustained by the non-favored
buyer. 10 Other courts have refused to permit such awards, on the
ground that proof of price discrimination alone cannot prove
actual damage to the non-favored buyer's business,11 and have
required plaintiffs to prove "special damages" in the form of
"lost profits" and depreciated value of the business as a going
concern.12 After examining the principles which govern proof of
damages in treble damage actions, the discussion which follows
will analyze the types of loss or damage which a non-favored buyer
can suffer as a result of price (or price-related) discrimination by
a seller, the way in which such loss can occur, and appropriate
methods for proving and measuring that loss.

I.

ELEMENTS AND PRINCIPLES OF PROOF

A plaintiff's cause of action for treble damages consists of four
essential elements: (1) an antitrust violation; (2) the existence of
actual damage to his business or property; (3) a proximate causal
relationship between that damage and the defendant's unlawful
acts; and (4) a basis for measuring or estimating the amount of
that damage with a reasonable degree of accuracy. Proof of these
four elements properly falls into three distinct stages as the second
and third elements are established in the same stage.13
10 "[The petitioner] would establish its right to recover three times the discriminatory
difference without proving more than the illegality of the prices. If the prices are illegally
discriminatory, petitioner has been damaged, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, at least in the amount of that discrimination." Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American
Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 757 (1947) (dictum). In Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass
Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945), the court awarded "general
damages" in the amount of a discrimination (difference) in allowances made to buyers for
clerks' or demonstrators' salaries which violated §§ 2(d), (e) of the Robinson-Patman Act.
The court in American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., supra note 7, at 55, found
that the plaintiff had not been damaged but added, "We do not doubt that, ordinarily,
where a seller is guilty of unlawful discrimination in prices between customers, the
amount of the price difference is the measure of damages ..•."
11 E.g., Enterprise Indus. v. The Tex. Co., 240 F.2d 457, 459, 460 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957) (amount of a price discrimination not a proper measure of
damages); Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.
1949) (amount of a price-related discrimination not a valid measure of damages). See also
Timberlake, supra note 3, at 259.
12 See cases cited notes 40-45 infra.
13 See Timberlake, supra note 3, at 231 n.2.
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The Violation

Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits price discrimination the effect of which "may be substantially to lessen
competition ... , or to injure ... competition ... with customers
[of any person who grants such discrimination] . . . ." 14 This
provision does not require that competition actually be lessened
or injured before a violation can be found, but only that there
be a "reasonable possibility" for the price discrimination to injure
or substantially to lessen competition.15 Because a sufficient possibility of a "substantial lessening" of, or injury to, second-line
competition will be inferred from the fact that a "substantial"
price discrimination existed, and because a price discrimination is
merely a price difference,16 a violation of section 2(a) can be established simply by showing that a seller sold goods of like grade
and quality in interstate commerce to competing customers at
"substantially" different prices.17
14 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (Supp. 1961) (emphasis added).
For discussion of the Robinson-Patman Act, see generally EDWARDS, THE PRICE DisCRIMI•
NATION LAW (1959); RmVE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Am: (1962).
15 FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 46 (1948); Standard Motor Prods. v. FTC,
265 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1959); Edelmann v. FTC, 239 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958); Moog Indus. v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43, 51 (8th Cir. 1956)
The Supreme Court had earlier indicated that a reasonable "probability" of an injury
to competition was necessary. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 738 (1945).
16 FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549 (1960); FTC v. Morton Salt Co.,
supra note 15, at 45.
17 FTC v. Morton Salt Co., supra note 15, at 46-47, 50-51; Standard Motor Prods. v.
FTC, 265 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1959); Edelmann v. FTC, 239 F.2d 152, 154-55 (7th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958); Moog Indus. v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43, 50-51 (8th
Cir. 1956); Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345, 353 (E.D.N.Y.
1960). Where a substantial price difference exists, the fact that individual buyers agree
they have not been hurt by the discrimination is not considered necessarily inconsistent
with a finding of a possibility or probability of injury to competition. Whitaker Cable
Corp. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 253,255 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957); Edelmann
v. FTC, supra at 155; Moog Indus. v. FTC, supra at 50-51.
"To show injury in the secondary line, there is need only to show that the favored
and disfavored customers were in competition with one another and that the amount
of the price difference was substantial, either as a part of the sale price or as a part of
the profit margin or in the aggregate saving that it made available to the favored customers. From substantiality in relation to sales price, the Commission can infer differences
in resale price and diversion of trade or significant differences in operating profit. From
substantiality in relation to operating margin, the Commission can infer an effect on
profits. From substantiality in the total benefit obtained through discrimination, the
Commission can infer a significant addition to the funds available for sales promotion,
and consequent diversion of trade. It is not necessary to ascertain by examination of the
facts that changes in business practice or diversion of trade actually occurred. Since the
facts as to each commodity can be considered separately without regard to the importance
of that commodity in the customer's total business, injury to competition among cus-
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The cases indicate that a "substantial" price difference is simply one which, in the context of a particular market situation, is
not negligible. 18 There apparently remains considerable disagreement as to the amount of evidence necessary to establish that a
price difference was "substantial," and as to the extent to which
the trier of fact is required to inquire into the actual effect which
a price difference may have (or have had) on the market. The
quantum of evidence necessary will vary from case to case, of
course, but it would appear that the burden is on the defendant
to persuade the trier of fact that the price difference in question
was so insignificant or insubstantial that second-line competition
could not possibly (or probably) have been "substantially lessened"
or injured. At any rate, if a price difference is significant or substantial when compared with the resale price or profit on the item
involved (or on the unit in which the item is incorporated), an
appellate court without looking further will affirm a finding that
injury to competition was sufficiently possible to establish a violation of section 2(a).19
tomers may be discovered by inference, even when the commodity is so small a part of
the customer's sales volume that the customer is aware of no injury.'' EnwARDs, op. cit.
supra note 14, at 234.
The burden is on the defendant to justify the price difference, if grounds for legal
justification exist. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. Supp. § 13(b) (1961); FTC v. Morton
Salt Co., supra note 15, at 44-45.
'Where the violation charged is price discrimination in first-line competition (seller
competing with seller) rather than in second-line competition (buyers competing with
buyers who all purchase from seller who discriminates in price), a substantial lessening
of, or injury to, competition will not be so readily inferred. There the possibility or
probability of injury to competition must be shown. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., supra
note 16. However, the Supreme Court took care to note:
"Of course we do not depart from our holding in Federal Trade Comm'n. v. Morton
Salt, ••• as to adequacy of proof of tendency to injure competition in cases involving discrimination between purchasers. The instant case, as we have pointed out, involves
differences in prices among competing sellers.'' Id. at 552 n.21.
18 Com Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 739 (1945); Edelmann v. FTC, supra note
17, at 155; Whitaker Cable Corp. v. FTC, supra note 17, at 256; Minneapolis-Honeywell
Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786, 789, 792 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. granted, 342 U.S. 940
(1952), cert. dismissed as untimely, 344 U.S. 206 (1952); cf. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., supra
note 15, at 49.
"The substantiality of a price difference is to be shown through proof (1) that the
price difference is large enough to affect significantly the buyer's profit margin in reselling,
(2) that if the price difference were reflected in resale prices it would significantly affect
the buying decisions of customers in resale markets, or (3) that the price difference provides, for the favored buyer, an aggregate saving large enough to be used for significant
business purposes. Where the discrimination is substantial by any of these tests, an
inference that the discrimination is injurious to the class of customers that does not
receive it is thought to be inescapable.'' EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 14, at 532.
10 See FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549 (1960); FTC v. Morton Salt Co.,
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Sections 2(d) and (e) of the Robinson-Patman Act make it
unlawful for a seller to pay for or to provide services or facilities
to customers in connection with the sale of commodities to those
customers, except on proportionately equal terms. 20 A discrimination in violation of these sections is per se unlawful and no
effect on competition need be shown.21
B.

The Fact and Amount of Damage

Having established the violation, a plaintiff must next establish the existence of actual damage proximately caused by the
defendant's violation, and its amount. 22
The identification of three distinct elements in proof of
damage (existence, causation and amount) which are to be established in two stages, and the grouping of proof of existence and
causation together as one stage which is differentiated from proof
of amount, may at first appear artificial. After all, proof of an
amount of damage necessarily establishes the existence of that
damage. Further, even if it is shown that defendant's acts caused
a loss to plaintiff, specific amounts of loss claimed must be shown
to have been part of that loss which was caused by defendant.
Thus, proof of causation seems a necessary part of proving amount,
and proof of the existence of damage hardly seems a separate
requirement, especially where virtually the same evidence is used
to establish all three elements. Indeed, it has been suggested that
proof of the fact of damage (existence and causation) and meassupra note 15, at 46. For discussion of proof of competitive effect under § 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act, see generally EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 14, at 223-36, 531-45;
RowE, op cit. supra note 14, at chs. 6, 8; Arr'Y. GEN. NAT'L Coi.n,1. ANTITRUST REP.
160-70; Kalinowski, Price Discrimination and Competitive Effects, 17 A.B.A. ANTITRUST
SECTION 382-86 (1960); Rowe, Borderland Issues, A.B.A. Antitrust Section 60-72 (April
5-6, 1956); Note, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1597 (1961).
20 49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(d), (e) (Supp. 1961). See generally Comment, 29
U. CHI. L. REv. 160 (1961).
21 See FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 65 (1959) (dictum); State Wholesale
Grocers v. Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., 258 F.2d 831, 837-38 (7th Cir. 1958); Sun Cosmetic
Shoppe v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1949); Elizabeth Arden
Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 994-95 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773
(1945).
22 For general discussion of proof of damages in private treble damage suits, see
Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in Private Antitrust
Suits, 52 MICH. L. Rev. 363 (1954); Timberlake, supra note 3; Comment, 18 U. CHI. L. REv.
130, 131 (1950); Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1022-27 (1952).
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urement of the amount of damage may be only a single step
rather than a two-step process.23
In fact, however, there are good reasons for maintaining a
distinction between proving the existence of compensable loss and
proving the amount of damages. 24 A treble damage plaintiff cannot always prove specific and individually identifiable items of
loss, each readily measurable. Frequently he will be forced to
seek recovery for a general or overall loss, and in such cases the
amount of loss cannot usually be proved with a great degree of
exactness.25 Who can prove exactly how many sales he would have
made and at what profit, but for an unlawful advantage given his
competitor?
If the plaintiff did lose some sales because of an unlawful
advantage given his competitor, or sustained some other form of
damage, however, the fact that some such loss did occur,26 and
that it was caused by the defendant's acts,27 can usually be per23 See Banana Distribs. v. United Fruit Co., 162 F. Supp. 32, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), rev'd
on other grounds, 269 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1959); Clark, supra note 22, at 374-75.
24. See Timberlake, supra note 3, at 232, 240.
25 This is true in any case where the plaintiff sues for a general loss of sales. The
"movie cases" are good examples. See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251
(1946); Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's, 190 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1951); Bordonaro Bros.
Theaters v. Paramount Pictures, 176 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1949). See also Enterprise Indus. v.
The Tex. Co., 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957).
26 Financial records are generally essential, however. See, e.g., Enterprise Indus. v.
The Tex. Co., supra note 25, at 458-59; Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 389-90
(9th Cir.), cert denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957); Seigfried v. Kansas City Star Co., 193 F. Supp.
427, 436-37 (W.D. Mo. 1961), afj'd, 298 F.2d I, 6-8 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 819
(1962).
27 Proof of causation must generally be made with circumstantial evidence and the
burden of proof is on the plaintiff. E.g., Atlas Bldg. Prods. v. Diamond Block 8: Gravel
Co., 269 F. 2d 950, 957-58 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960); Sano Petroleum
Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345, 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Momand v. Universal
Film Exch., 72 F. Supp. 469, 482 (D. Mass. 1947), afj'd, 172 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948);
Lowry v. Tile, Mantel 8: Gravel Co., 106 Fed. 38, 46 (C.C.N.D. Calif. 1900), aff'd sub nom.
Montague v. Lowry, 115 Fed. 27 (9th Cir. 1902), aff'd, 193 U.S. 38 (1904). The fact that
in a given case the amount of the discrimination was substantial as compared with the
plaintiff's operating costs will be persuasive evidence as to causation, American Can Co.
v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F.2d 763, 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 899
(1931); Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985, 989-90 (S.D. Fla. 1949), aff'd,
187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951), especially when coupled with other evidence such as customer
testimony to the effect that the favored competitor's lower prices induced the customers
to buy from the competitor rather than from the plaintiff. American Can Co. v. Ladoga
Canning Co., supra at 768-69. Such evidence may alone be sufficient to establish causation,
absent a showing to the contrary. See Richfield Oil Corp. v. Karseal Corp., 271 F.2d 709,
712-13 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 961 (1960); Banana Distribs. v. United Fruit
Co., 162 F. Supp. 32, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 269 F,2d 790 (2d Cir.
1959). The burden is on the defendant to rebut the plaintiff's showing of causation once
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suasively shown. Furthermore, it must be persuasively shown.
The treble damage action being essentially compensatory, a plaintiff is required to prove the existence of such actual economic
loss caused by the defendant's acts before a treble damage recovery can be awarded.28 It is here that the "actual damage" requirement exerts its influence. A court may not speculate as to
whether an antitrust violation may have injured a particular plaintiff, and the fact of actual loss may not be inferred simply from
the fact that a price discrimination existed, for a price discrimination will not always and inevitably cause such a loss to one who
does not receive its benefit as the subsequent analysis of the types
of damage and how they occur will indicate.20
a persuasive showing has been made. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251,
264 (1946); Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., supra at 988. If the defendant can show
that plaintiff's losses were due to other causes, plaintiff is not entitled to recover. See
Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler &: Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 1960 Trade Cas. 77215,
77238-39 (9th Cir. 1960); Atlas Bldg. Prods. v. Diamond Block &: Gravel Co., supra at
957-58; Prentice Mach. Co. v. Associated Plywood Mills, 252 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 951 (1958); American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., supra at 770; McWirter v. Monroe Calculating Mach. Co., 76 F. Supp. 456, 462-63, 465 (W.D. Mo. 1948).
Plaintiff can recover, however, if defendant's violations were the most substantial cause of
the plaintiff's losses. See Riss &: Co. v. Association of Am. R.Rs., 1960 Trade Cas. 76873,
76877 (D.D.C. 1960); Momand v. Universal Film Exch., supra at 482. See generally
Timberlake, supra note 3, at 234-40; Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1016-19 (1952).
28 See Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler &: Smith Citrus Prods. Co., supra note 27, at
77240; Talon, Inc. v. Union Slide Fastener, Inc., 1959 Trade Cas. 75260, 75262 (9th Cir.
1959); Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 392 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835
(1957); Peller v. International Boxing Club, 227 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1955); American Can
Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38, 54 (8th Cir. 1951); Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v.
Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 1949); Momand v. Universal Films
Exchs., 172 F.2d 37, 42-43 (1st Cir. 1948); Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417 (7th
Cir. 1942); Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345, 353 (E.D.N.Y.
1960); Youngson v. Tidewater Oil Co., 166 F. Supp. 146, 147 (D. Ore. 1958); McWirter
v. Monroe Calculating Mach. Co., 76 F. Supp. 456, 465 (W.D. Mo. 1948).
29 In Duff v. Kansas City Star Co., 299 F.2d 320, 323 (8th Cir. 1962), the court said:
"The trial court very correctly stated [that the] 'gist of a private treble-damage action
is not the violation of the antitrust laws, as such, but is the allegation of facts from which
it may be inferred that a party plaintiff was caused direct injury to his business or
property as a result of such violation • • • .' "
In American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., supra note 28, at 54, the court said:
"It is our understanding that, in order for a plaintiff to recover damages ••., it is not
enough to show that a defendant was guilty of price discriminations which might lessen
or injure competition, but it is also necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the wrong
done proximately resulted in ascertainable damage to its business and property.''
In Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., supra note 28, at 353, the court said:
"In this Circuit [Second], proof of discrimination in price establishes a prima facie case
that the discrimination is one proscribed by section 2(a) so as to shift to the defendant
the burden of proving that the discrimination is not proscribed. • • • But there is no
presumption that the proscribed discrimination in price has caused damage to the
plaintiff. The burden of proving such damage is always on the plaintiff.'' See also Herman
Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 297 F.2d 906, 909-10 (2d Cir. 1962); authorities
cited note 11 supra.
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Once the existence of actual economic loss caused by defendant's acts has been established, the plaintiff must still measure
the amount of his loss. It is one thing to prove that some sales were
lost to a competitor, however, and quite another to prove the
amount of profit that would have been made had the sales not
been lost. In the early days of the treble damage action, stringent
proof requirements as to the amount of damage tended to defeat
recoveries even where there was no doubt that the plaintiff had
suffered substantial economic loss as a result of the defendant's
antitrust violation, for as a practical matter it was (and is) almost
impossible to determine exactly the amount of loss in a given
case.30 Practicality necessitated a less exacting requirement of
proof as to the amount of damage; and because the plaintiff's
inability to prove with precision what his profit would have been
absent the defendant's wrongdoing was, after all, the result of the
defendant's wrongdoing, it was only equitable that the plaintiff
should be permitted to estimate in a reasonable manner the
amount of his loss.31 The amount of damage may thus be estimated from relevant data which is sufficient to make the estimate
reasonably accurate.32 This does not mean that the amount of
the damage award may be based on speculation or guesswork,
however; 33 though proof requirements for measuring or valuing
the amount of damage are relaxed once the fact of damage has
been established, this relaxation is intended to eliminate impossible proof requirements, not to make proof of amount unnecessary.34
Even where the same evidence is used to prove both the fact
and the amount of damage, the distinction between the two stages
Clark, supra note 22, at 367-69.
See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1946); Story Parchment
Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563-66 (1931); Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379 (1927).
32 Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, supra note 31, at 264-66; Story Parchment Co. v.
Paterson Parchment Paper Co., supra note 31, at 563; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern
Photo Materials Co., supra note 31, at 379; Talon, Inc. v. Union Slide Fastener, Inc., 1959
Trade Cas. 75260, 75262 (9th Cir. 1959).
33 Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, supra note 31, at 264; Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Southern Photo Materials Co., supra note 31, at 379.
34 See Siegfried v. Kansas City Star Co., 298 F.2d 1, 7-8 (8th Cir.), affirming 193 F.
Supp. 427, 431-34, 436, 438 (W.D. Mo. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 819 (1962); Herman
Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 297 F.2d 906, 909-10, 912-15 (2d Cir. 1962);
Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods., 1960 Trade Cas. 77215, 77241
(9th Cir. 1960); Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 835 (1957).
30
31
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of proof must be kept clear in order to preserve their qualitative
differences.35 The fact that the amount of damages may be estimated must not be misconstrued so as to destroy the requirement
that a treble damage plaintiff cannot recover unless he proves with
certainty the existence of actual economic loss caused by the defendant's unlawful acts.
Proof of the existence of damage caused by defendant's violation, the second stage in a plaintiff's proof, must of course be
clearly distinguished from the first stage in which he proves the
violation. There, as we have seen, the requisite possibility of a
"substantial lessening" of or "injury" to competition under section 2(a) can be inferred from the existence of a substantial price
discrimination without further proof,36 and the furnishing of or
paying for services or facilities for purchasers on terms not proportionately equal is per se unlawful under sections 2(d) and (e). 37
A finding of damage to an individual plaintiff may not rest upon
a generalized finding of a possibility of injury to competition nor
upon the fact that the discrimination was per se unlawful. A
finding of "damage" must rest upon a specific finding of economic
loss suffered by that plaintiff and caused by the defendant's unlawful acts.
At the same time the fact and the amount of a price or pricerelated discrimination may be a very important part of a plaintiff's proof; while it cannot establish the existence of damage, it
can be persuasive proof of causation.38 In the usual case the fact
that the discrimination complained of was substantial when viewed
35 In Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562
(1931), the Court said: "It is true that there was uncertainty as to the extent of the
damage, but there was none as to the fact of damage; and there is a clear distinction
between the measure of proof necessary to establish the fact that petitioner had sustained
some damage, and the measure of proof necessary to enable the jury to fix the amount.
The rule which precludes the recovery of uncertain damages applies to such as arc not
the certain result of the wrong, not to those damages which are definitely attributable
to the wrong and only uncertain in respect of their amount."
In Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, supra note 34, at 392, the court said: "The cases have
drawn a distinction between the quantum of proof necessary to show the fact as distinguished from the amount of damage; the burden as to the former is the more stringent one. In other words, the fact of injury must first be shown before the jury is allowed
to estimate the amount of damage."
See also Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods., supra note 34, at
77240; Talon, Inc. v. United Slide Fastener, Inc., 1959 Trade Cas. 75260 (9th Cir. 1959).
36 See cases cited note 17 supra.
37 See authorities cited notes 20, 21 supra.
38 See cases on proving causation cited note 27 supra.
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in the market situation will not be the only evidence tending
to show causation, but in every case where such a showing can
be made it will be important evidence on the causation question
once the existence of actual loss has been demonstrated.

II.

THE NATURE OF DAMAGE AND APPLICATION

OF PRINCIPLES OF PROOF

A. Indirect or Consequential Damage
A non-favored buyer can suffer damage as a direct or as an
indirect result of a seller's price discrimination. Because the
nature of the causal relationship between violation and damage
has an important bearing on the application of principles of proof
to specific types of damage, it is important that the distinction
between direct and indirect damage be understood. 39
If a non-favored buyer does suffer some loss as a result of a
price discrimination the loss is most likely to occur indirectly
through operation of the competitive process. Perhaps the most
obvious type of such indirect or consequential damage is the loss
of prospective profits which results from a loss of sales to favored
competitors. In this instance the amount of profit which would
have been made on the sales which were lost constitutes damage.40
Indirect damage may also be sustained through a decrease in the
plaintiff's profit margin on continuing operations, i.e., on those
sales which the plaintiff was able to retain. This form of indirect
loss can occur in three distinct ways. A non-favored buyer may
find it necessary to incur an increase in his sales or operating
expenses in attempting to avoid or offset the competitive advanso The terms "direct damage" and "indirect damage" have been adopted here to
denote two broad categories of damage and this terminology is used throughout this
comment. The courts have generally used the term "special damages" to refer to the
types of loss here labeled "indirect damage."
_.o E.g., Atlas Bldg. Prods. v. Diamond Block &: Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 958 (10th
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960) (first-line competition-profit lost on sales
which would have been made but for price discrimination); Richfield Oil Corp. v.
Karseal Corp., 271 F.2d 709, 714-15 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 961 (1960)
(first-line competition-profit lost on sales which would have been made but,for illegal
restraint); Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 390 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
835 (1957) {second-line competition-loss of profits on sales which plaintiff would have
made but for defendant's unlawful refusal to sell to plaintiff); Enterprise Indus. v. The
Tex. Co., 240 F.2d 457, 458-59 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957) (second-line
competition-loss of profits necessary to show damage); Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. Elizabeth
.Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 1949) (second-line competition-loss resulting
from diversion of customers).
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tage conferred upon favored buyers by the discrimination.41 If,
instead of increasing his sales or operating expenses, the nonfavored buyer decides to reduce his resale price to meet the competition of favored buyers, his profit margin will similarly be
reduced.42 Such involuntary price reductions are similar to increased selling and operating expenses in that both represent
a loss of profit incurred in mitigating the loss inflicted by the
discriminatory advantage of favored buyers.43 Finally, if a nonfavored buyer loses sales he may find that in addition to a loss
of anticipated profits on those sales, he has suffered an increase
in the unit cost of producing, handling, or even selling the particular commodity involved due to a loss of economies of large
scale operation.44 In each of these three instances the amount of
the decrease in profit margin on continuing operations constitutes
damage.
A third type of indirect damage may be found in a general
depreciation of the value of the plaintiff's business as a gomg
41 Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 996 (8th Cir.), cert
denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945) (second-line competition-increased cost of operation of
plaintiff's cosmetic department); cf. Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp.,
supra note 40. Such expenses can result, for example, from increased advertising, increased
promotion or sales effort (as in Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., supra), or
additional sales features offered with the product involved. An increase in a non-favored
buyer's cost of doing business can also occur in the form of a direct and unlawfully
discriminatory increase in the price charged the buyer by the seller, in excess of the
price which would have prevailed absent the discrimination. This type of increased
costs will be considered under the heading "direct damage.''
42 American Co-op. Serum Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co., 153 F.2d 907, 914 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 721 (1946) (first-line competition-profit lost by reducing selling
price to meet competition); Youngson v. Tidewater Oil Co., 166 F. Supp. 146 (D. Ore. 1958)
(second-line competition-amount of reduction in resale price necessary to meet reduced
prices of favored competitors); cf. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper
Co., 282 U.S. 555, 561 (1931), in which defendants conspired unlawfully to drive plaintiff
out of business by selling in competition with plaintiff at prices below cost. Plaintiff,
forced to lower its prices to meet the competition, recovered the difference between the
lower sale price and what the sale price would have been absent defendants' conspiracy.
43 In some instances a buyer may be required to mitigate his loss. See cases cited
note 9 supra. A reasonable opportunity to mitigate should exist, of course. The require•
ment could not be imposed prior to the time when the buyer knew that a loss was
occurring, and one should not be required to mitigate his loss if it is not economically
feasible to do so, or where it would involve unreasonable hardship. It would seem that
a reasonable business judgment against spending money in mitigation should not limit
a plaintiff's recovery for loss sustained. Where mitigation is required, however, recovery
should be limited to the cost of mitigation so far as it would or did involve expense
exceeding usual business expenses.
44 Atlas Bldg. Prods. v. Diamond Block 8e Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 958 (10th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960) (first-line competition-increased cost of production
due to reduced sales).
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concern, reflecting the reduced business-getting ability of the
business and the effect which the impairment of its competitive
position may be expected to have on its prospects for future operation and growth.45
The various types of indirect damage possess a common characteristic which distinguishes them from direct damage (discussed
later)- they can occur only if the non-favored buyer loses sales
or is forced to incur an increase in cost or a decrease in profit to
avoid a loss of sales. Such a loss or threatened loss of sales is not
inflicted by the discrimination itsel£46 but by favored buyers' use
of the competitive advantage given them by the discrimination
in the form of lower purchase or operating costs compared to
those of non-favored buyers.
Two significant consequences flow from the causal characteristics of indirect damage. First, the fact that a discrimination
occurred does not necessarily indicate that a non-favored buyer
suffered any loss. Second, the amount of such indirect damage
as may occur in any given case bears no necessary or predictable
relationship either to the amount of the discrimination involved _
or to the complainant's purchase volume.
Before a loss can occur the discriminatory benefit must be
competitively used by a favored buyer in such a way that the nonfavored buyer feels the effect of its use in his business. If the
amount of the discrimination is distributed by a favored buyer
45 Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 566-67 (1931)
(first-line competition-depreciation in value of plaintiff's plant); Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co.
v. Diamond Block &: Gravel Co., supra note 44, at 958-59 (first-line competition-extent to
which value of plaintiff's assets or property had been diminished); Flintkote Co. v.
Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 389-90 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957) (second-line
competition-expenses incurred by plaintiff in establishing business which was caused to
fail in its infancy); Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985, 992 (S.D. Fla.
1949), aff'd, 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951) (second-line competition-injury to overall
business structure and operation reflected in failure to maintain progress in line with the
growth of the citrus industry in Florida). It should be noted that the depreciated value
of a business will reflect a loss of good-will and hence that loss of good-will is not a
separate item of damage.
However, the various types of loss or damage discussed above as indirect damages
are not mutually exclusive and several types of loss may exist simultaneously. Atlas
Bldg. Prods. v. Diamond Block &: Gravel Co., supra note 44, at 958-59; Flintkote
Co. v. Lysfjord, supra at 389-90. Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., supra at 992-93,
recognized that care must be taken to avoid overlapping in various categories of loss,
though the court manifested an inability to separate categories of loss with any significant
degree of specificity.
46 It must be remembered that the discussion in this comment is concerned only with
the effect of price discrimination in second-line competition.
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as additional profits it could hardly be the cause of competitive
harm to any non-favored buyer. Even if it is retained in the favored buyer's business, it cannot cause a loss to any non-favored
buyer unless it is used against him. Thus if a defendant seller
could show that favored buyers used the amount of the discrimination in competitive effort directed at competitors other than
the complaining non-favored buyer,47 or that the amount of the
discrimination simply was not used competitively,48 the defendant
seller would seem to have established that the discrimination could
not have damaged the complainant.
Furthermore, even if a favored buyer uses the amount of the
discrimination competitively against a non-favored buyer, that
use will not inevitably hurt the latter buyer. Before he can suffer
any loss the competitive use made of the discriminatory benefit
by the favored buyer must be effective actually to influence the
choice which third-line customers make in deciding whether or
not to buy from the non-favored buyer, for unless the non-favored
buyer loses sales as a result of the discrimination (or is forced to
incur expense or loss of profit to avoid a loss of sales), he cannot
be injured by it in any way thus far discussed. The use to which
the discrimination is put must be sufficient in the particular
market situation to overcome other factors which influence the
third-line customer's decision. Those factors may include business reputation, location, facilities, quality and extent of services
offered, sales personalities, nature of sales approach and promotional activity, variety and extent of stock on hand, and credit
policy, as well as pricing. Where the complaining buyer is a
manufacturer or processor relevant factors may also include brand
reputation, product features, and product quality.40 The type of
competitive use made of the discrimination may also be important,
for the effect of general advertising, price reductions, or concen47 It is perhaps possible that the complainant could be hurt if the use of the dis•
crimination against some competitors caused a general intensification of competition in
the market as a whole. This particular circumstance seems unlikely and would be
extremely difficult to prove.
48 It would seem that a plaintiff's failure to show any intensified sales effort (advertising, price reduction, etc.) by favored competitors would be persuasive evidence that the
discriminatory benefit was not used competitively. Some showing as to the probable use
made of the benefit is necessary to a plaintiff's case, for absent such showing it would seem
impossible for him to establish that alleged damage was caused by the defendant's
discrimination.
49 In some instances competing buyers may sell different products. In such a case the
interchangeability of the ultimate competing products themselves becomes an important
factor. See American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38, 56 (8th Cir. 1951).
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trated sales effort directed at particular customers may not be
the same even in a given market situation.
In determining the effect that a price discrimination may
have had on a non-favored buyer's business, therefore, it may be
necessary to consider a number of variable market factors. It
may also be necessary to consider certain characteristics of the
discrimination itself. The amount of the discrimination and the
length of time during which it was given may be significant, for
unless the amount involved was substantial as compared at least
with the non-favored buyer's resale profit margin on the item (or
on the unit in which the item was incorporated) the discrimination may have had no real competitive value. The nature of the
item affected by the discrimination may be significant, for the
fact that a competitor received a price break on a minor component of a large assembled unit, or on an item which was of
little consequence in the total business involved, may not have
given the competitor any real competitive advantage.50 Where
the item represented a significant part of the buyer's cost of doing
business the situation may be entirely different. 51 Furthermore,
the geographic markets in which favored and non-favored buyers
sell are not necessarily coextensive in every case. The extent to
which a complaining non-favored buyer did business in competition with favored buyers during the period of discrimination
may thus be an important factor in determining the extent to
which a price discrimination may have caused loss to the nonfavored buyer.
It should be apparent that the amount of any type of indirect
damage is not determined by the amount of the discrimination
and is not influenced by the complainant's purchase volume.
Rather, the amount of such damage is determined by the interplay
of competitive market factors which are influenced by the presence
of discrimination, and is dependent upon the complainant's loss
or prospective loss of sales volume. 52
50 In Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786, 791-92 (7th Cir.
1951), cert. granted, 342 U.S. 940 (1952), cert. dismissed as untimely, 344 U.S. 206 (1952),
the court found no reasonable possibility that discrimination in the pricing of heating
controls could "substantially injure" competition in heating units into which the controls
were built (and hence no violation of § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act).
51 See, e.g., American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F.2d 763, 766, 768 (7th Cir.
1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 899 (1931); Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp.
985, 989-90 (S.D. Fla. 1949), afj'd, 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951).
52 The number of sales lost bears no necessary relationship to the amount of plaintiff's
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B. Proof of Indirect Damage

I. Loss of Profit on Anticipated Sales Lost
to Favored Competitors
In proving the fact of loss plaintiff must establish the existence of a business loss in the form of a loss of sales. This can be
established from plaintiff's business records by showing a decline
of sales volume (or of the rate of growth of sales volume) in the
item involved in the discrimination during the period in question. 53 In some cases it may be necessary to compare plaintiff's
sales figures with those of his competitors. Of course the fact
that the non-favored buyer lost sales to a favored buyer, or was
threatened with such a loss, does not make the seller liable for the
non-favored buyer's attendant damage unless the discrimination
was the proximate cause of the damage. Thus, if a plaintiff claims
damage from a loss of sales, he must show not only that sales were
lost to a favored competitor but that it was the competitive advantage given the competitor by the seller's price discrimination that.
enabled the competitor to take those sales from the plaintiff. 114
The fact that the loss of sales of the item in question was
caused by defendant's price (or price-related) discrimination can
be established by showing that favored competitors did not suffer
a similar decline in sales or sales growth (i.e., that the loss was
peculiar to the plaintiff's business), and that the discrimination
was substantial in amount and competitively used by one or more
of plaintiff's favored competitors. In the case of a discriminatorily
excessive charge (discussed later under "direct damage") plaintiff
would show that he was forced to raise his resale prices substantially above the competitive resale price level. Customer testimony
and other evidence concerning the effect which the favored buyer's
competitive use of the discrimination had on the customers' buying decisions may be important, as may evidence of plaintiff's
purchases, particularly if the plaintiff did only part of his business in competition with
favored competitors. Further, even the total number of units sold by plaintiff during the
period when he was feeling the effect of the discrimination is not necessarily the same
as the number of units he purchased during the period. If the plaintiff was drawing
from inventory on hand at the beginning of the period, he may have purchased less
than he sold; if he carried over inventory at the end of the period he may have purchased
more than he sold.
113

114

See generally cases cited note 40 supra.
See generally cases cited notes 27, 40 supra.
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good business management. Plaintiff's evidence must, however,
outweigh the defendant's evidence tending to show that the discrimination and its use by favored buyers was not substantial
enough to influence customers' buying decisions, and that plaintiff's loss was caused by factors such as bad management, business
recession (affecting the item in question), sales technique, and
others. 1111
Once the fact that a loss of sales was caused by defendant's
discrimination is established, plaintiff must provide a reasonably
accurate means of estimating the amount of loss. If the loss of
specific sales can be shown56 plaintiff's business records should
provide a basis for calculating the amount of profit that would
have been made on each sale, and that profit per sale can be
multiplied by the number of sales lost. 57 If specific sales lost cannot be determined, various methods of approximation are available. These include comparison of the plaintiff's sales volume
before the impact of defendant's violation with sales volume during the violation, comparison of plaintiff's sales volume during
the period of defendant's violation with the sales volume of a
comparable business not affected by defendant's violation, and
expert testimony as to hypothetical sales volume. 58 In each instance evidence as to probable costs will be necessary because loss
is measured by anticipated profit, not by anticipated gross receipts.

2. Loss of Profit Margin on Continuing Operations
a. Increased Sales and Operating Expenses. The very existence of the expenses demonstrates that loss occurred. The fact
that the loss was proximately caused by defendant's violation can
be established by showing that the expenses were reasonably necessary to meet or offset competitive activity of one or more favored
buyers, and that the competitive activity of those favored buyers
represented a use of the benefit conferred upon them by the
defendant-seller's discrimination. The entire amount of such exSee generally cases cited notes 27, 40-42 supra.
This may be possible where sales are of a large item, such as business machines.
See McWhirter v. Monroe Calculating Mach. Co., 76 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Mo. 1948),
where, however, plaintiff failed to show that the defendant's violations were the cause of
of plaintiff's loss of sales.
117 See cases cited note 40 supra.
118 An excellent and recent discussion of these methods of approximation is found in
Timberlake, supra note 3, at 261-77.
115
116
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penses (insofar as not "passed on") 59 represents damage to the
plaintiff,60 and can easily be proved from the plaintiff's business
records.
b. Involuntary Resale Price Reductions. Here plaintiff must
show that he lowered his resale price (or did not raise it when
he normally would have), and that the price reduction was reasonably necessary to combat the effect of competitive activity
(price cutting or other activity) by favored competitors made
possible by defendant's discrimination. Such a loss represents
another cost of mitigation and is measured by the amount of the
reduction (or the amount by which the resale price would otherwise have been raised) multiplied by the number of sales made
at the reduced price. 61 These figures should be readily ascertainable from plaintiff's business records.
c. Loss of Economies of Scale. The fact of loss is established
by figures showing reduced production or reduced total sales of
the item involved and by cost figures showing an increase in the
unit cost of production or handling. Causation is established by
showing that the reduced production or sales represents a loss
of sales already shown to have been caused by favored competitors' use of the benefit conferred by the defendant seller's discrimination. The amount of damages is calculated by multiplying
the amount of increased unit cost by the number of units produced or sold during the period in question. 62
3.

Depreciated Value of the Business

The difficulties of proving this type of loss would bear extensive discussion, but in the context of this comment it will
suffice to observe generally that evidence showing a depreciation
in value of the plaintiff's business, and that the depreciation was
the result of a loss of sales caused by defendant's discrimination,
See discussion regarding "passing on" in text accompanying notes 73-76 infra.
See Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 389-90 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
835 (1957); Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 996 (8th Cir),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945).
61 American Co-op. Serum Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co., 153 F.2d 907, 914 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 721 (1946); Youngson v. Tidewater Oil Co., 166 F. Supp. 146, 147
(D. Ore. 1958); cf. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 561
(1931).
62 See generally Atlas Bldg. Prods. v. Diamond Block &: Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 958
(10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960). Conceivably the "passing on" defense
could come into play here.
59

60
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will establish the existence of compensable loss. The amount of
damages is measured by the amount of the depreciation so shovm. 63

C.

Direct or Immediate Damage

The only way in which a seller's price discrimination can
directly injure a non-favored buyer is by causing that buyer to
pay a higher price for the commodities in question than he would
pay absent the seller's discrimination. Here the damage is not
inflicted by a favored buyer's use of the discrimination but by
the discrimination itself.
Direct damage of this sort can be found where a seller, in
violation of the antitrust laws, causes a buyer to pay a price in
excess of a reasonable price-a reasonable price being the price
which would prevail if the market were free of the seller's unlawful conduct. In such a case the buyer is damaged in the amount
by which the price he was forced to pay exceeded the price which
he would have paid if the market had been free of the seller's unlawful conduct,64 at least to the extent that the buyer does not
otherwise recoup this loss. 65
As a general principle of antitrust damage law this concept
of direct damage through unlawfully excessive prices66 is hardly
63 See cases cited note 45 supra; Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requirements and
Proof of Damages in Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 30 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 2!11, 277-8!1 (1961).
'64 Thomsen v. Cayser, 24!1 U.S. 66, 88 (1917) ("If . . . more than a reasonable rate
was secured by the [unlawful] combination, the excess over what was reasonable was an
element of injury."); Chattanooga Foundry v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1960) (city
injured where caused by unlawful conspiracy to pay a price for pipe in excess of a
reasonable price); Peto v. Howell, 101 F.2d 353, 361 (7th Cir. 1938) ("enhancement" of
price resulting from defendant's illegal monopoly held actionable damage); Straus v.
Victor Talking Mach. Co., 297 Fed. 791, 799, 803 (2d Cir. 1924) (plaintiff recovered
difference between tbe defendant-seller's established price, which was found reasonable,
and the inflated price, which an illegal combination caused plaintiff to pay); American
Sea Green Slate Co. v. O'Halloran, 229 Fed. 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1915) (where plaintiff alleges
damage because unlawful combination compelled him to buy at a price higher than
market value, he must show evidence as to market value in the years in question);
Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 80 F. Supp.
888, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (one paying a price to a monopolist may recover "the amount
of any overcharge,'' but must offer evidence from which the overcharge can be approximated). See also cases cited notes 68-69 infra.
65 See, e.g., Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d 747, 750 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941) (plaintiff failed to show any loss in profit margin and hence was
denied recovery-the inflated purchase price was "passed on" to plaintiff's customers).
66 It is important to distinguish between direct damage in the form of an unlawfully imposed increase in buying cost (i.e., an excessive charge), and indirect damage
in the form of an increase in the general cost of doing business resulting from ex-
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subject to question. The principle was originally established in
actions under section 7 of the Sherman Act and carried over into
actions under section 4 of the Clayton Act (which superseded the
old section 7). Although it has received suprisingly little discussion in recent years the continuing validity of the principle has
not been challenged67 and examples of its recent application in
situations paralleling price discrimination can be found. In Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord68 the defendant, pursuant to a conspiracy to
monopolize trade, refused to sell tile to the plaintiff buyer and
the buyer was consequently forced to turn to a more expensive
source of supply. The buyer was permitted to recover as one
element of its damage the amount by which the cost of obtaining
tile was thus increased. In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 69 the plaintiff buyer was held to have a cause of
action for damages where the defendant seller, through its unlawful control of the market, charged plaintiff an excessive price
for the lease of shoe machinery. The amount of damage was held
to be "the difference between what plaintiff was charged and what
it could properly have been charged in the absence of the monopolistic practices."
Unfortunately, it is not clear whether there has been judicial
recognition of the applicability of this principle of damage to
price (or price-related) discrimination cases.70 But there can be
penditures which a non-favored buyer found it necessary to make in order to offset
the competitive advantage of a favored buyer so as to avoid a loss of sales (and of
the prospective profits which those sales represent) to the favored buyer. While both
types of damage are "increased costs" and operate to decrease the non-favored buyer's
profit margin, they nonetheless occur differently and are caused differently, and it is
possible for them to exist simultaneously. In the case of direct damage it is the seller's
wrongful acts that alter the non-favored buyer's profit margin. 'Where indirect damage
(in the form of increased costs) is involved, the non-favored buyer alters his own profit
margin to combat the competitive market effect of the seller's wrongful acts. It may
be observed that the so-called "passing on" defense should theoretically apply to any
type of damage in the form of increased costs.
67 See, e.g., Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in
Private Antitrust Suits, 52 MrcH. L. REv. 363, 404 (1954); Comment, 70 YALE L.J.
469 (1961). The authors accept the principle without question. The cases which consider the "passing on" defense implicitly assume the validity of this fundamental
principle of damages. See cases cited note 75 infra.
68 246 F.2d 368, 389-90 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957).
69 185 F. Supp. 826, 829 (M.D. Pa.), afj'd, 281 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 901 (1960).
70 See, e.g., Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 757 (1947);
Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 996 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 773 (1945); Becker-Lehmann v. Firestone Tire 8c Rubber Co., 1959 Trade Cas.
75406, 75409 (E.D. Mo. 1959); Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985,
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little doubt that the principle is as applicable to an excessive price
which is unlawful because discriminatory as it is to an excessive
price which is unlawful because made possible by a monopoly
or by a conspiracy to monopolize or restrain trade. In either
case the buyer is forced to incur an increase in his cost of doing
business which, but for the unlawful conduct of the seller, he
would not have had to incur, and that increase in cost represents
damage to the buyer insofar as the buyer's business thereby realizes a lower profit than it would have absent the discrimination.
It is important to observe, however, that the mere fact that
one buyer paid more for his goods than another does not mean
that the first buyer necessarily paid more than he would have
if the seller had not discriminated against him. If the seller
gave a special discount on only a small portion of his business,
it is unlikely that in any event he would have given a similar
discount on all sales. Absent the discrimination the complaining
buyer (along with all other buyers) would probably have paid
the same price he paid during the period of discrimination, or
at best a price somewhere between the price he did pay and the
lowest price paid by a favored buyer.
Consequently, an "excessive price" situation must be carefully
distinguished from a "discounted price'' situation. A buyer pays
an "excessive price" to the extent that he pays more than he
would have paid in a market free of the seller's unlawful conduct.
A buyer pays a "discounted price" to the extent that he pays less
than he would have in a market free of the seller's unlawful
conduct. The fact that a favored buyer receives a discount will
not damage a non-favored buyer unless the favored buyer uses
his competitive advantage (lower costs) effectively to threaten the
non-favored buyer with a loss of sales. The fact that a non-favored
buyer pays an excessive price, on the other hand, damages him
immediately and directly by increasing his cost of purchasing the
commodities he uses or resells over what that cost would otherwise be, and can also damage him indirectly to the extent that
his competitive disadvantage (higher buying costs than his com990 (S.D. Fla. 1949), afj'd, 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951). But see Siegfried v. Kansas City
Star Co., 193 F. Supp. 427, 432 (W.D. Mo. 1961), afj'd, 298 F.2d I (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 819 (1962); State Wholesale Grocers v. The Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Civil
No. 56 C 418, N.D. Ill., May 31, 1961 (the unequal expense burden in handling defendant's products, which claimant would not have had to bear if there had been
no discrimination, held a direct business damage).
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petitor) causes him to lose sales to his competitor or to incur other
expenses to avoid such a loss of sales.
Even though an unlawfully excessive price involves a form
of "damage" which is directly imposed on the buyer by the seller,
the buyer may not necessarily recover the amount by which the
price charged was excessive merely by showing that he was charged
more than he would have been charged absent the discrimination.71 The defendant seller may defeat the buyer's claim by
showing that the buyer would have made no more profit even if
he had not had to pay the excessive prices which the seller unlawfully charged, and hence that the buyer was not actually damaged by the excessive prices.72 The requirement that a plaintiff
in a treble damage action can recover only for damage actually
sustained gives rise therefore to the sometimes misunderstood
"passing on" defense in treble damage actions based on price
discrimination or the charging of unlawfully high prices.73
The "passing on" defense arises from a recognition of the
fact that in some peculiar market situations where the buyer's
resale profit is not strongly dependent •upon his buying cost (as
distinguished from general operating cost) it is possible for a
buyer to pay "excessive prices" for a commodity he resells without
being any worse off financially than he would be if he had paid
a lower price, and that if the buyer is no worse off he has not
actually been damaged "in his business or property." 74 The classic
71 This is in sharp contrast to the right given in an action under the Interstate
Commerce Act, 49 Stat. 543 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 8 (1958), to recover the
amount of an overcharge or excessive charge (the amount by which the price charged
exceeded the published rates) as such, without reference to whether the plaintiff was
damaged by the overcharge. Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580,
582-83 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945); Northwestern Oil Co. v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967, 970-71 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944);
Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d 747, 750-51 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 644 (1941). See ICC v. United States, 289 U.S. 385, 390-91 (1933); Southern Pac.
Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Co., 245 U.S. 531, 533-34 (1918) (the fact that plaintiffs were
able to pass on the amount of the unreasonable charge will not prevent their recov•
ering the overpayment from the carriers); Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 236 U.S. 412,
428-29 (1915); Pennsylvania R.R. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184, 202-03
(1913).
72 See cases cited notes 74, 75 infra.
73 For discussion of the "passing on" defense, see generally: Clark, supra note 67,
at 404-06; Timberlake, supra note 63, at 249-51; Comment, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 130, 135-37
(1950); Comment, 70 YALE L.J. 469 (1961); Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1023-26 (1952).
There seems no reason in theory why this defense should not apply to increased costs
sustained in avoiding a loss of sales equally as well as to increased buying costs.
74 This is generally approached as a question of whether or not the plaintiff
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example of this situation, typically involving non-discriminatory
pricing, is found in the Oil Jobbers cases75 in which the resale
prices of gasoline were determined by a formula which included a
fixed profit margin for distributors and where distributors of competing brands followed the price leadership of one primary brand.
There the fact that the defendants raised the price of gasoline to distributors did not cause the distributors to lose any sales (for competing distributors resold at the same higher resale prices),76 nor
recouped ("passed on'') the amount by which the prices were excessive. Dictum in
two cases suggests it may also be approached as a question of whether plaintiff would
have been any better off at a lower purchase price. "Exaction of this higher . . •
rate may not have injured Keogh at all; for a lower rate might not have benefited him.
Every competitor was entitled to be put-and we must presume would have been puton a parity with him. • . . Under these circumstances no court or jury could say
that, if the rate had been lower, Keogh would have enjoyed the difference between
the rates or that any other advantage would have accrued to him. The benefit might
have gone to his customers, or conceivably, to the ultimate consumer." Keogh v. Chicago & No. W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 165 (1922).
"[T]he only claim . • . as to damages actually suffered is . . • that if plaintiff
could have bought its gasoline at the lower price allegedly paid by other purchasers,
it would have increased its profits by the amount of this price differential. This is,
of course, entirely speculative. It assumes that plaintiff could have continued to sell
gasoline at the same price while paying less for it, an unlikely eventuality in view of
the fact that it was in competition with other retail dealers buying from defendant who
would also have to receive the benefit of a lower price from defendant and could
therefore lower their retail price." Secatore's, Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 171 F. Supp.
665, 667-68 (D. Mass. 1959).
At times the "passing on" defense has apparently been viewed as involving a very
mechanical test. "[T]o prove his damages the plaintiff must show (1) that the defendant illegally increased the price of plaintiff's supplies, and (2) plaintiff's selling
price did not then rise enough to compensate for the rise in costs." Clark, supra note
67, at 406. See Banana Distribs. v. United Fruit Co., 162 F. Supp. 32, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1958),
rev'd on other grounds, 269 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1959); cf. Miller Motors v. Ford Motor
Co., 252 F,2d 441, 448 (4th Cir. 1958); Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 225 F.2d 427, 433
(9th Cir. 1955).
Such a mechanical test, however, will not work in the situation where a buyer's
resale price is responsive to the influence of a variety of factors in addition to buying
cost and consequently does not vary in a fixed relationship to buying cost. The court
in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 826, 829-31 (M.D. Pa.),
aff'd, 281 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 901 (1960), apparently recognized this
fact in holding the defense of "passing on" was not available where the injured customer was a consumer (manufacturer) rather than a middleman. The discussion in
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786, 791-92 (7th Cir. 1951),
cert. granted, 342 U.S. 940 (1952), cert. dismissed as untimely, 344 U.S. 206 (1952) is
relevant to this point, though no damage issue was before the court in that case.
75 Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 734 (1945); Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d
747 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941).
76 It has been suggested that loss might have occurred through an industry-wide
decrease in volume of sales. See Comment, 18 U. Cm. L. REv. 130, 136 (1950); cf. Clark,
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to lose any profit on sales made (for if the price to them had not
been raised, their resale prices would have been set lower to give
them the same margin of profit).
The Oil Jobbers cases, of course, presented a very unusual
market situation. Normally, resale profit is primarily dependent
upon the cost of buying the particular commodity involved, and
it is not so likely that a buyer will be able to escape damage if he
raises his resale price after paying an unlawfully excessive purchase
price; this is especially true if the excessive price is discriminatory
rather than uniform to all buyers as it was in the Oil,Jobbers cases.
For one thing, the buyer might well have raised his resale price
even though his purchase cost had not been raised, assuming the
possibility of raising the resale price without a significant loss of
sales. In this circumstance the excessive purchase price which he
was caused to pay reduced the profit the buyer would otherwise
have made from his advanced resale prices. The amount by which
the purchase price was excessive would thus remain direct damage which was not, and probably could not have been, "passed on."
On the other hand, if the buyer was forced to raise his resale price
in a market where he would not otherwise have raised it, he has
recouped his direct loss by "passing it on," but he then is likely
to suffer consequential or indirect damages resulting from a loss
of sales.77
The "passing on" defense illustrates the basic fact that a private treble damage claimant may not recover damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act unless he shows that he would have
been financially better off if he had been free of the defendant's
unlawful conduct, i.e., that he would have made profits which the
defendant's conduct prevented him from making.78
supra note 67, at 406. This would seem doubtful and highly speculative, however, in
view of the nature of the commodity and the market there involved.
77 In the Oil Jobbers cases the "passing on" precluded both direct and indirect
damage, because the distributors were no worse off either as to profit margin or as to
sales volume. Where a discriminatory price is "passed on" however, the buyer is
likely to suffer "indirect damage" from reduced sales volume even though he may be
no worse off as to profit margin and hence sustains no "direct damage."
78 It is interesting to observe that while an overcharge can be recovered under the
Interstate Commerce Act without further inquiry as to damage sustained, the amount
of a discriminatory rebate or discount given a shipper other than the plaintiff cannot
be recovered as such. Recovery in the latter instance is permitted only for such damage
as the plaintiff can prove he sustained as a result of the discrimination. ICC v. United
States, 289 U.S. 385, 390-91 (1933); Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 236 U.S. 412, 428-29
(1915); Pennsylvania R.R. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184, 202-03 (1913).

1962]

COMMENTS

1129

D. Proof of Direct Damage
A direct loss in the form of an excessive charge exacted by the
seller can be established simply by showing that the plaintiff paid
more for certain commodities than he would have absent the discrimination,70 and that the plaintiff's profit margin was thereby
reduced (i.e., that the excessive charge was not "passed on"). 80
Such a showing establishes the existence of the loss, and the fact
that the defendant-seller charged the discriminatorily excessive
price conclusively establishes causation. The amount of the damage is the difference between what plaintiff did pay, and what he
would have paid absent the defendant's discrimination, multiplied
by the amount of plaintiff's purchases during the period of dis70 See cases cited notes 64, 68, 69 supra. If a price-discrimination occurs in items
which are not bought for resale but rather which represent a capital investment (as in
bu}ing machinery for a plant, or equipment for a store or a bowling alley), or which
are used in manufacturing another product, the basic inquiry remains the same: Would
the non-favored buyer (plaintiff) have paid less absent the discrimination? If so, he
has sustained direct damage in the amount by which the price he paid exceeded the
price he would have paid absent the seller's discrimination. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 826, 829-31 (M.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd, 281 F.2d 481
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 901 (1960), which held that the "passing on" defense
is not available to a defendant seller where the injured buyer is a "consumer" (manufacturer) rather than a middleman; hence, where the item involved represents capital
investment or is consumed in manufacturing another product, plaintiff need not prove
that the excessive charge actually reduced his profit margin.
Whether or not the non-favored buyer of such an item paid more than he would
have absent the seller's discrimination, he can recover the amount of such indirect
damage as he may have sustained as a result of the competitive advantage given favored
competitors by the discrimination.
so ,vhere it can reasonably be inferred from the facts that the excessive charge
was not or could not have been "passed on,'' the existence of an unlawful excessive
charge will be prima facie evidence that the plaintiff buyer's profit margin was reduced.
See cases cited notes 64, 68 supra. ,vhere the facts suggest that the excessive charge
may have been "passed on" by the plaintiff, rather than "absorbed,'' the plaintiff may
be required to show that his retail price was not increased in an amount representing
all or part of the excessive charge. See Miller Motors v. Ford Motor Co., 252 F.2d 441,
448 (4th Cir. 1958); Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 225 F.2d 427, 433 (9th Cir. 1955); Clark
Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580, 582 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 326 U.S.
734 (1945); Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967, 971 (7th Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d
747, 750 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941); Banana Distribs. v. United Fruit Co.,
162 F. Supp. 32, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 269 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1959).
But see Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., supra note 79, at 829-31, which
held that such a showing was not necessary where the plaintiff was a consumer (manufacturer) of goods bought from defendant, rather than a middleman. The inquiry, of
course, is whether the plaintiff's profit margin was lower as a result of the defendant's
violation, not simply whether or not the plaintiff raised his resale price. The mere
fact that the plaintiff raised his resale price should not be considered as a mechanical
test for "passing on" in market situations where the buyer's resale price is responsive
to the influence of factors other than buying cost alone, and consequently does not
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crimination81 (provided none of that difference was "passed on"
to consumers). It should be observed that in this instance the
amount of damage is related to the amount of plaintiff's purchases
and is totally unrelated to his volume of sales during the period.
This is the only instance in which damage is dependent upon
purchase volume rather than on sales volume. Even here, however,
the amount of damage bears no necessary relationship to the
amount of the discrimination, for while the non-favored buyer
might have paid less in the absence of the seller's discrimination,
all buyers in that event might have paid more than the favored
buyers actually did during the period of discrimination, and such
loss as the non-favored buyer did sustain may have been "passed
on" in whole or in part.
It will not be possible to determine whether a price charged
a non-favored buyer was excessive, and in what amount, until it
has been determined what that buyer would have been charged if
the seller had not discriminated in price. The determination of
what the "reasonable market price" would have been absent the
seller's discrimination may include consideration of such factors
as: (1) the price charged by other sellers of similar goods; (2) the
portion of the defendant-seller's business done at low prices compared with the portion done at high prices; (3) the defendantseller's profit margin; (4) the defendant-seller's own competitive
position (including the desirability of the defendant-seller's product and the practical availability of interchangeable competing
products; (5) the extent to which favored and non-favored buyers
did business in competition with each other; and (6) when available, the prices prevailing after the end of the period of violation.
vary in a fixed or constant relationship to buying cost. See note 74 supra and text
accompanying note 77 supra. It has been suggested in dictum that where all buyers
have paid an excessive (but non-discriminatory) price none of them necessarily have
been damaged because all would have received the benefit of a lower price (assuming
lawful pricing) and competition might then have forced the resale price down accordingly. Keogh v. Chicago & No. W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 165 (1922); Secatore's, Inc. v.
Esso Standard Oil Co., 171 F. Supp. 665, 667-68 (D. Mass. 1959). This rationale can
apply where the plaintiff paid a discriminatorily excessive price only if other com•
peting buyers were also discriminated against by the defendant seller.
81 See Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917); Chattanooga Foundry v. Atlanta, 203
U.S. 390 (1906); Peto v. Howell, 101 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1938); Strauss v. Victor Talking
Mach. Co., 297 Fed. 791 (2d Cir. 1924); American Sea Green Slate Co. v. O'Halloran, 229
Fed. 77 (2d Cir. 1915); Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors &:
Publishers, 80 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). See also Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957).
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Naturally, courts and defendants' attorneys would prefer to avoid
the necessity of making such a determination, but the necessity for
such determinations is not new in antitrust proceedings82 and would
appear inevitable within the present framework of antitrust damage law. Some of the apparent impossibilities of such a determination disappear when it is remembered that only the existence of
compensable loss need be proved with certainty. If plaintiff's evidence shows he would have paid some price less than he did, and
the defendant's evidence does not rebut that showing, the fact of
loss has been established. The amount of loss then need only be
estimated, though of course the evidence must provide a basis for
estimating the amount of loss with reasonable accuracy.

E.

Damage Resulting From Price-Related Discrimination

It should be noted that price-related discriminations can operate in the same way as ordinary price discriminations. For example,
if a seller provides a favored buyer with a clerk or demonstrator,
or with advertising, or if the seller gives the favored buyer an
allowance to be used to finance a demonstrator or advertising, and
if that favored buyer did not already have the demonstrator or
was not already doing the particular advertising involved, the use
of the demonstrator or the advertising represents increased promotional activity by the favored buyer. This extra promotional
activity may cause non-favored competing buyers to lose sales and
hence to suffer damage in the form of lost profits,83 and may
also force the non-favored buyer to hire a similar demonstrator
or to increase his advertising in order to avoid a continuing loss
of sales. If he would not have incurred that increased expense
but for the influence of the seller's discrimination, the nonfavored buyer has suffered damage in the form of involuntarily
increased operating expenses.84
82 See Thomsen v. Cayser, supra note 81; Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure
Oil Co., 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941); Peto v. Howell, supra
note 81; American Sea Green Slate Co. v. O'Halloran, supra note 81, at 80; AldenRochelle, Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, supra note 81.
83 See Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.
1949).
84 It would appear that this was the situation in Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. Elizabeth
Arden Sales Corp., supra note 83, at 153, reversing 82 F. Supp. 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
There the plaintiff alleged that the defendant furnished services of "special personnel,"
82 F. Supp. at 687, and "supplied .•• assistants" to plaintiff's competitors, 178 F.2d
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A price-related discrimination can also cause direct damage in
the form of excessive costs. For example, if a seller gives favored
buyers an allowance to be used to pay the salary of clerks already
employed by the favored buyers and which the favored buyers
would have employed even without the benefit of the discrimination, or an allowance to pay for advertising which the favored
buyers would have done even without the benefit of the discrimination, then the seller's discrimination has lowered the operating
costs of the favored buyers. If a non-favored buyer can show that
he too would have received an allowance but for the discrimination, the amount of such allowance which he would have received
represents damage in the form of "increased" costs, directly imposed by the seller's discrimination. 85 Proof of damage resulting
at 151. This would seem to indicate that these "assistants" were not simply existing
employees of the competitors, but were not additions to their staffs.
85 Apparently that was the situation in Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass
Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945). There plaintiff took on
the Elizabeth Arden cosmetics line under an oral agreement in which the defendant
agreed "to designate one of the clerks in appellee's [plaintiff's] toilet-goods department as an Elizabeth Arden 'demonstrator,' " and to pay or reimburse plaintiff for
one-half of the clerk's salary. Id. at 990. This would seem to indicate that the clerks
involved were already employed by the plaintiff and by his more favored competitors
(who received an allowance for a whole clerk's salary). The trial court found that
absent the defendant's discrimination the plaintiff's costs would have been reduced by
one-half of a clerk's salary, and hence that plaintiff was damaged in that amount.
Id. at 995. The appellate court found direct loss in the "increased cost" of operation
for plaintiff's cosmetics department, but noted that all discriminations do not necessarily cause direct damage. Id. at 996.
The author Gudge Johnsen) of the Elizabeth Arden opinion, dissenting in American
Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1951), said at 61, that in
Elizabeth Arden "[W]e held .•. that discrimination in favor of one dealer in a seller's
products as against an immediate competitor, in granting allowances for services or
facilities furnished by the dealer in marketing the seller's products, or in providing
contributions of services or facilities to the dealer for such marketing, which were violative .•. of the Act, were recoverable as direct or immediate damages, to the extent of
the illegal difference, where that difference represented money which the dealer would
have saved in expenses or for which he would have been reimbursed ... , if the seller had
accorded him equal treatment with his competitor. . • • [D]amages in such cases normally will consist of the amount which would have been saved in price or expense
or restored through reimbursement, if there had been equal treatment. • • • Damages
in the cash amount or cash value of such illegal discriminations seems to me therefore
virtually automatically to follow under the Act as between immediate competitors • • • ."
(Emphasis added.)
The only error in this reasoning would appear to be the implicit assumption that
absent discrimination, all dealers would have received (or should have received) an
allowance representing a clerk's whole salary. The Elizabeth Arden opinion does not
intimate whether there was any evidentiary basis for finding that the plaintiff would
have received an allowance for a whole salary. In the American Can case, the error
in reasoning is apparent, for there, absent the violation, the plaintiff would have paid
more, rather than less, than he did during the period of violation. On this ground
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from price-related discrimination is therefore no different from
proof of damage from ordinary price discrimination.

III.

THE PROBLEM OF IMPLIED OR "AUTOMATIC" DAMAGES
AND GENERAL DAMAGES

A treble damage award is clearly valid where the existence of
specific types of loss has been demonstrated and the amount of each
type or category of loss has been estimated in a reasonably reliable
fashion. Such an award is probably best described as a "special
damages" award, using the term "special damages" as it is apparently used in the cases to denote items of damage specifically
proved. The question remains, however, as to what extent the fact
and amount of the discrimination in a given case may in and of
itself establish either the fact of loss or the amount of damages.

A.

"Automatic" Damages

It can be argued that, except in rare situations, the plaintiff can
show damage simply by proving the fact of an unlawful discrimination. 86 Two basic ideas are advanced in support of this proposition:
(1) a buyer who is discriminated against by a seller is placed in a
less advantageous competitive position as a result of the discrimination and must inevitably be injured as a result; 87 (2) a seller who
the majority held plaintiff had not been damaged. Judge Johnsen's "error in reasoning"
in his dissent in American Can was not, however, inadvertent, for in the Elizabeth
Arden opinion he had intimated that once a seller had discriminated among competing
buyers, the seller would be compelled to accord the "equality" of treatment required
under the statute, by an award of damages to non-favored buyers in the amount of
the discrimination. It would appear that Judge Johnsen's view was rejected by the
majority in the American Can case (the same three judges decided both Elizabeth Arden
and American Can). But see State Wholesale Grocers v. The Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co., Civil No. 56 C 418, N.D. Ill., May 31, 1961, remanded by 258 F.2d 831 (7th Cir.
1958). There, defendants had violated § 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act by buying
advertising in a magazine published for A&P and used by A&P as a promotional device,
without making comparable advertising or promotional allowances available to other
retailers competing with A&P. The trial judge, in following the Elizabeth Arden decision, apparently accepted Judge Johnsen's view, for he indicated that retailers who
advertised during the period of violation had been damaged "at least to the extent
of the payments they ought to have received from the defendants, for unlike A&P,
they have borne the cost of their advertising without the benefit of the defendants' aid."
(Emphasis added.)
See Clark, supra note 67, at 394.
See, e.g., Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947); American
Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38, 55 (8th Cir. 1951); Clark, supra note
67, at 408.
86
87
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gave a benefit to one buyer in violation of the Robinson-Patman
Act should be compelled to give the same benefit to others; for if
non-favored buyers had been treated as well as favored buyers
were, non-favored buyers would have had more money in their
treasuries to use as they chose and hence they have been damaged.88
A "convenient" measure of such "inevitable loss" is the amount
of the concession given favored buyers or the amount by which
non-favored buyers are charged more than their competitors.
Thus, when the plaintiff cannot or does not prove any specific
losses, the award of "automatic damages" in the amount of the
discrimination may be thought to be justified.
This view, while it may appear reasonable in some situations,
has much to condemn it. 89 Its primary weakness lies in its tendency
to confuse cause and effect. Ostensibly identifying an immediate
and direct economic injury in the fact of the discrimination itself,
this view does not require the plaintiff to show either actual detrimental competitive effect or that absent the discrimination he
would have enjoyed a greater profit margin.90 But damage is by
definition an effect-for our purposes the effect which unequal
treatment has on a non-favored buyer. Unequal treatment is not
itself an effect, but a cause.91 In actuality, therefore, the view supss See Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 996 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945); State Wholesale Grocers v. The Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea
Co., Civil No. 56 C 418, N.D. Ill., May 31, 1961 (the unequal expense burden in handling
defendant's products, which claimant would not have had to bear, held a direct business
damage); Barber, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: The Robinson-Patman
Experience, 30 GEo. WASH. L. R.Ev. 181, 220 (1961).
Insofar as lack of equality may reflect a burden of expense that the complainant
would not have had to bear but for the discrimination (supported by a finding that
absent the discrimination complainant would have gotten the same favors that favored
competitors received during the discrimination, and that complainant's resale price and
volume would not have lowered), the "inequality" idea is an inarticulate reference to
damage in the form of unrecouped increased expenses.
89 See generally Clark, supra note 67, at 408-09.
90 It should be noted that this view of direct damage has not been unequivocally
adopted by any court and would perhaps be rejected by all courts. Some commentators,
however, have interpreted judicial language to suggest this result. E.g., Comment, 18
U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 130, 137 (1950); Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1023-24 (1952). Perhaps the
confusion has been strengthened by judicial statements in cases where the issue was
not actual damage to an individual business but rather the reasonable possibility of
general injury to competition, such as: "[T]he Commission found what would appear
to be obvious, that the competitive opportunities of certain merchants were injured
when they had to pay respondent substantially more for their goods than their competitors had to pay." FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1948).
91 Even where unequal treatment actually places a greater financial burden on the
non-favored buyer than he would otherwise have borne in handling the defendant's
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porting an automatic damage award involves an inference of
damage from the fact of a violation. A suspicion of damage is
given the respectability of a finding of damage. In some cases this
may be a legimate inference, subject to rebuttal by the defendant,
for circumstantial evidence, so familiar in antitrust actions, can be
very convincing. But the possibility of a legitimate inference of
fact from circumstantial evidence is a matter of proof, individual
to each case, and such a mere possibility should not be elevated to
the dignity of a general proposition or concept of damage. Such a
"concept" of damage does not represent any independent category
of damage; it is simply an inarticulate reference to every type of
damage previously discussed. Moreover, insofar as "automatic
damages" are thought to restore "equality," the effect of the
trebling provision of section 4 of the Clayton Act is completely
ignored. The former beneficiary of a discrimination, who may well
have been quite innocent of any ·wrongdoing, would become its
inadvertent victim.92
In any event, the great weight of authority indicates that the
goods, this "greater burden" is an effect (in the form of increased buying or operating
costs) which requires proof. It should not be inferred simply from an inequality of
treatment.
~2 See Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 997 (8th Cir.)
(dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945). The U.S. Supreme Court's celebrated dictum in Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 757 (1947),
that a plaintiff "would establish its right to recover three times the discriminatory
difference without proving more than the illegality of the prices," remains a bit embarrassing; but even as dictum it would not seem to have been carefully considered
by the Court. The issue before the Court, whether a Robinson-Patman Act violation
could be raised as a defense to an action on notes representing indebtedness for goods
delivered, had a difficult history. The state trial court had denied the defense. The
Florida Supreme Court reversed in a five-to-two decision, and then on rehearing, in a
four-to-three decision (without opinion), held that the defense was not available on
the facts in evidence. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 155 Fla. 877, 22 So. 2d
461 (1945). The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed by an equally divided court without
opinion, 327 U.S. 758 (1946), granted a rehearing, 327 U.S. 812 (1946), and then
reaffirmed in an eight-to-one decision, 330 U.S. 743 (1947). The petitioner's argument
before the Supreme Court was essentially that it had been charged an unlawfully discriminatory price over and above the fair value of cans purchased, that it had paid
the fair value of the cans, that the amount remaining due on its notes represented
the amount by which it had been overcharged, and hence that the notes could not
be collected by legal action. 330 U.S. 743, 748, 758-59. The Court rejected this argument on the ground that petitioner was attempting to measure its injury by the amount
of credit it received, rather than by the injury sustained. 330 U.S. 743, 753. In light
of petitioner's argument the Court's dictum makes sense. See Enterprise Indus. v. The
Tex. Co., 240 F.2d 457, 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957). But in light of
statements made by the Court at 330 U.S. 743, 746, 753, the dictum seems ill-considered
nonetheless.
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view favoring "automatic" damages has been rejected.93 For that
view runs counter to the cases requiring proof of "special damages,"94 requiring that plaintiff prove with certainty9 5 the fact that
defendant's violation did cause some economic loss in his business,96
and denying recovery of d~mages representing a windfall. 07 It
ignores the realiti~s of market effects and represents a serious lack
of understanding of the nature of, and the difference between,
direct and indirect forms of damage resulting from price discrimination. Finally, it ignores the difference between proof of
violation and proof of damage,0 8 and contradicts the cases which
indicate that proof of violation does not establish damage. 90
B.

General Damages

A somewhat stronger case can be made for an award where the
existence and cause of damage have been shown, and the plaintiff
is then permitted to measure his damage by the amount of the
discrimination involved. This type of award may be conveniently
93 In Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580, 583 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 734 (1945), the court stated: "[I]n an action [under the Interstate Commerce Act]
to recover a freight overcharge • • . the amount of damages recoverable is fixed or is at
least susceptible of being made certain by mathematical calculations, and hence, they
are liquidated damages. On the other hand, an action to recover treble damages under
the Clayton Act is based upon tort and the amount of compensatory damages which
may be recovered cannot be determined and is not fixed by statutory provisions, but
the damages are unliquidated." But see Clark, supra note 67, at 406-11.
94 See cases cited note 11 supra.
95 See cases cited note 7 supra.
96 See Keogh v. Chicago No. W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922); Miller Motors v. Ford
Motor Co., 252 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1958); Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 225 F.2d 427 (9th
Cir. 1955); Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 734 (1945); Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d
747 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941); Secatore's, Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co.,
171 F. Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1959); Banana Distribs. v. United Fruit Co., 162 F. Supp.
32 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 269 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1959). See also cases
cited note 28 supra.
97 See cases cited note 8 supra.
98 See Keogh v. Chicago No. W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922); Miller Motors v. Ford
Motor Co., 252 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1958); Enterprise Indus. v. The Tex. Co., 240 F.2d
457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957); Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945); Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony•
Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); Twin Ports
Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941);
Secatore's, Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 171 F. Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1959); Banana Dis•
tribs. v. United Fruit Co., 162 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 269
F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1959); Momand v. Universal Film Exch., 72 F. Supp. 469, afj'd, 172
F .2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948).
99 See cases cited notes 11, 29 supra.
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-though somewhat inaccurately-termed a "general damages"
award. 100 It can be argued that by their nature damages resulting
from price discriminations are 'very difficult and at times impossible to prove, and that a refusal to award "general damages," at
least where the plaintiff has shovm the actual existence of some
damage but cannot prove the amount of damages, runs counter to
the policy of the antitrust laws. It may be said that by such a refusal the private treble damage action will be rendered ineffective
as an instrument of antitrust enforcement,101 the policy of compensating persons injured by violations of the antitrust laws will
be frustrated, and the victim rather than the wrongdoer will be
required to bear the risk of the uncertainty created by the wrongdoing. It can further be argued that an injunction is remedial
rather than deterrent in effect, for while it causes unlawful conduct
to be discontinued it does not prevent the original initiation of that
conduct, and that such penalties as may exist, other than the damage action, are not always sufficient to make unlawful conduct unprofitable. The private treble damage action, on the other hand,
100 The term "general damages," as it has been used in some price discrimination
cases, is rather puzzling. Generally the term has significance with respect to the method
of pleading rather than with respect to the method of proof. "General damages"
usually designates damages which are commonly found to follow a specific type of wrong.
Such damages need not be specifically pleaded, for defendants' attorneys know that
damages in this class will be placed in issue. On the other hand, the term "special
damages" usually denotes types of damage which are unusual or uncommon, and
which must be specifically pleaded to give notice to the defendant that they will be
placed in issue. The pleading significance of the terms was recognized by the court
in Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150, 153 (2d Cir.
1949). However, the term "general damages" has at times been used to imply an
automatic damage recovery or to denote a measure of damages (the amount-of-discrimination formula). See, e.g., Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988,
996 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 703 (1945). This use of the term would appear
to be both confusing and improper. First, it suggests that the amount of the discrimination in the usual case is itself damage, or is equivalent to the amount of damage.
This, as we have seen, is at best a fiction, and items of general damage, while they
need not be pleaded, must be proved as to amount just like items of special damage.
A "damage" award which requires no proof of amount is in fact an award of punitive
damages. The trebling provision of § 4 of the Clayton Act causes punitive damages
to be awarded automatically once actual damages have been proved. It does not
authorize an award of punitive damages in the first instance. Second, the distinction
implied between "general damages" (as an automatic or semi-automatic damage award)
and "special damages" (as items of loss specificially proved) is erroneous, for all ordinary business losses are general damages. See, e.g., Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. Elizabeth
Arden Sales Corp., supra at 153.
101 See Barber, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: The Robinson-Patman
Experience, 30 GEO. WASH. L REv. 181, 210-21 (1961), suggesting an automatic damage
approach to effectuate the enforcement function of the treble damage action; the discussion is especially relevant to the "general damage" approach.
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is not only remedial but deterrent in effect, for it makes violation a
costly and unprofitable proposition. Consequently, if a defendant
seller is permitted to escape liability for an injury shown to have
been inflicted, disregard of Robinson-Patman Act provisions will
not be discouraged and American business will thereby be deprived of a significant part of the protection which the RobinsonPatman Act, in conjunction with section 4 of the Clayton Act, was
intended to provide.
It can also be argued that plaintiff has been hurt because he was
not treated equally with favored buyers (this having been proved),
that the result of the inequality in treatment was to leave plaintiff
with a burden of expense which favored buyers did not have to
bear, and that if plaintiff had received the same benefits that
favored buyers received plaintiff would have been relieved of that
unequal burden of expense. Hence, plaintiff's damage may be
measured by the amount of the discrimination involved in a
given case.102
While these and other arguments are appealing in some cases,
the better view would clearly seem to be that they must be rejected.
A measure of damages, while it need not be precisely accurate,
must be one calculated to produce reasonably accurate resultsit may not be arbitrary or speculative.103 A plaintiff may not
simply prove a violation and an injury and then recover automatic or liquidated damages measured by the amount of the
discrimination. A rational basis for estimating the amount of loss
sustained in each individual case must be provided.104
Consequently, the amount of the discrimination in a given case
can be a valid measure of damages, but only if it is so related to the
loss which it caused as to approximate the amount of that loss with
reasonable accuracy. The entire preceding discussion, both as to
the nature of damage and as to proof of damage, indicates that
there is no necessary correlation between the amount of the discrimination and the amount of loss resulting to a non-favored
buyer, for the loss is generally caused indirectly and depends on
competitive effects on sales volume which are influenced by many
factors in addition to buying cost.105 Even where the loss is directly
102
103
10-1
105

See generally Barber, supra note 101, at 210-21.
See cases cited notes 33, 34 supra.
See cases cited notes 11, 29, 34, 93 supra.
It has been suggested that cases arising under the Interstate Commerce Act arc
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caused by the discrimination and is related to purchase volume (as
in the case of an excessive charge) the necessary correlation may be
lacking; absent discrimination the non-favored buyer (and all
buyers) would perhaps seldom have received as great a benefit as
favored buyers received during the period of discrimination, and
such loss as the non-favored buyer did sustain may have been
"passed on" in whole or in part.
If a loss actually occurred and its existence can be proved, certainly a reasonable method or combination of methods for estimating the amount of loss can be found among the variety of those
available. It would seem that the difficulties private plaintiffs have
had in recovering damages in private treble damage actions may be
ascribed not so much to "impossible" proof requirements as to
their own lack of understanding of what is involved in establishing
a claim for treble damages.
The arguments in favor of a "general damages" award and
those in favor of an "automatic damages" award are largely the
same, and it is difficult to separate the question of "general
not relevant to actions under § 4 of the Clayton Act. See Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp.
v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 995-96 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945). This
is true with respect to the freight overcharge cases where recovery is permitted without
reference to whether the overcharges resulted in actual damage to the plaintiff. See
note 71 supra. There seems to be no fundamental difference in principle between a
cause of action under the Interstate Commerce Act and the basic cause of action under
§ 4 of the Clayton Act, however, where suit is for damages allegedly suffered as the
result of the defendant's unlawful discrimination in pricing. In both cases the plaintiff
claims that unequal treatment caused him to suffer loss, and in both cases plaintiff
is permitted to recover only if he can prove that he did in fact suffer actual loss.
Compare cases cited note 7, 11 supra, with cases cited note 78 supra. Consequently,
principles discussed in actions under the Interstate Commerce Act for damages resulting
from price discrimination, are relevant to the present discussion. See Enterprise Indus.
v. The Tex. Co., 240 F.2d 457, 459-60 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957).
In ICC v. The United States, 289 U.S. 385 (1933), Mr. Justice Cardozo wrote at 389-90:
"'Vhen discrimination and that alone is the gist of the offense, the difference between
one rate and another is not the measure of the damages suffered by the shipper. • . .
"Overcharge and discrimination have very different consequences, and must be kept
distinct in thought. ,vhen the rate exacted of a shipper is excessive or unreasonable
in and of itself, irrespective of the rate exacted of competitors, there may be recovery
of the overcharge without other evidence of loss. . . . But a different measure of
recovery is applicable 'where a party that has paid only the reasonable rate sues upon
a discrimination because some other has paid less.' . • . Such a one is not to recover
as of course a payment reasonable in amount for a service given and accepted. He is
to recover the damages that he has suffered, which may be more than the preference
or less . • • , but which, whether more or less, is something to be proved and not
presumed. • • • The question is not how much better off the complainant would be
today if it had paid a lower rate. The question is how much worse off it is because
others have paid less.'' (Emphasis added.)
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damages" from that of "automatic damages." 106 Generally, when a
plaintiff argues that he should be permitted to "measure" his
damages -by the amount of the discrimination involved, he is actually seeking not only to measure damages but also to prove the
existence of loss simply by showing the existence of a price or
price-related discrimination.107 His complaint regarding the difficulty of proof of damages arises not because he cannot provide
a basis for estimating the amount of damages, but because he
cannot prove that he suffered any actual loss. In those cases
where "general damages" have actually been awarded, the existence of actual loss appears to have been inferred from what
seemed the apparent tendency of defendant's violation to injure
the plaintiff. The decisions reveal no actual evidence that absent
the unlawful discrimination plaintiff would have paid less for his
goods than he did, that he would have had less operating expenses,
or that he would have made more sales with an attendant increase
in profits.108 In other words, aside from the fact that a discrimination occurred, there apparently was no evidence that plaintiff would
have been better off financially absent the discrimination. Damages
seem to have been awarded in those cases on the ground that having
given a favor to one, defendant ought to have given an equal favor
to all. Such reasoning supports a finding of violation by defendant
but not a finding of actual economic loss suffered by plaintiff. Consequently, those cases would not seem to be authority for a "general
damages" award but for an "automatic damages" award.
Finally, the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act
indicates that Congress did not intend that damages should be
awarded in the absence of specific proof. Prior to the passage of
the Robinson-Patman Act, section 2 of the Senate bill contained
the following subsection:
"(e) For purposes of suit under section 4 of this Act, the
measure of damages for any violation of this section shall,
See note 100 supra.
See, e.g., Enterprise Indus. v. The Tex. Co., 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 965 (1957); American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38 (8th
Cir. 1951); Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.
1949); Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 773 (1945); State Wholesale Grocers v. The Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., Civil
No. 56 C 418, N.D. Ill., May 31, 1961.
10s See Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., supra note 107; State Wholesale Grocers v. The Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., supra note 107.
106
101
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where the fact of damage is shown, and in the absence of
proof of greater damage, be presumed to be the pecuniary
amount or equivalent of the prohibited discrimination, payment, or grant involved in such violation; limited, however" (I) Under subsections (a) and (b) above, by the volume
of plaintiff's business in the goods concerned, and for the
period of time concerned, in such violation;
"(2) Under subsection (c) above, to the amount or share,
or its pecuniary equivalent, to which plaintiff would have
been entitled if the payment concerned in such violation had
been made or offered on proportionally equal terms to all
customers competing in distribution of such products."109
This provision was entirely omitted from the final version of the
Robinson-Patman Act, indicating at the very least a deliberate
refusal by Congress to authorize such a measure of damages.U 0
The House Conference Committee Report explained:
"Subsection (e) of the Senate bill set up a new measure
of damages for violations of the law, whereas the House bill
left the damages to be determined in accordance with the provisions of the existing Clayton Act. The Senate receded."m
It might make sense, in answer to the above arguments, for
Congress to authorize an automatic recovery based on the amount
of the discrimination in a given case, in lieu of a treble damage
recovery under section 4 of the Clayton Act. Such an automatic
recovery would be in the nature of specific performance of the
defendant's statutory obligation to accord equality. Congress has
not authorized such a recovery, however, nor has it authorized section 4 of the Clayton Act to be used as an "equalization proceeding," which would only multiply inequalities in second-line competition by giving the plaintiff three times the advantage formerly
given a favored competitor.
It is not the function of the judiciary to rewrite antitrust damage law contrary to apparent congressional intent in an effort to
provide more effective enforcement of the antitrust laws and to
S. 3154, 7•ith Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
See Clark, supra note 67, at 406-07; 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 329, 331-33 (1957).
H.R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936). The attempt made in Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 996 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 773 (1945), to explain away this fact of legislative history, is not convincing. See
Enterprise Indus. v. The Tex. Co., 240 F.2d 457, 460 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
965 (1957); 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 329 (1957).
100
110
111
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"compensate" private plaintiffs who find it difficult to show that
they have been hurt. 112 If antitrust remedies presently available
are not sufficiently effective to enforce the antitrust laws Congress
should provide more effective measures, but until it sees fit to do
so, the judiciary should operate within the confines of those
remedies presently authorized.
Richard A. Miller, S.Ed.

112

Id. at 333.

